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GRAPPLING WITH “SOLICITATION”: THE NEED FOR STATUTORY 
REFORM IN NORTH CAROLINA AFTER LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
 
CHRISTOPHER R. MURRAY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In North Carolina, prior to the 2003 Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas,1 virtually any form of physical intimacy other than vaginal sex between a 
man and a woman was punishable as the felony “crime against nature.”2 Indeed, 
a mere invitation to participate in such a felony was punishable on a theory of 
derivative criminality at North Carolina common law as “solicitation of the 
crime against nature.”3 After Lawrence, however, statutes that would criminalize 
a personal choice in forms of physical intimacy are constitutionally invalid.4 It 
follows that if a given activity is no longer criminal, an offer to engage in that 
conduct is no longer punishable as solicitation. Or so it would seem. 
Teresa Pope was charged with solicitation of the crime against nature for 
offering oral sex for money to two undercover police officers.5 Solicitation is an 
inchoate offense—like attempt or conspiracy—that relies on the criminality of 
the underlying conduct. 6 Although oral sex by itself cannot be criminalized 
post-Lawrence, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held in State v. Pope that the 
charge of solicitation of the crime against nature survived Lawrence by virtue of 
an exception in that decision allowing criminalization of “prostitution.”7 But 
prostitution in North Carolina is governed by a separate statute that applies 
only to the commercialization of vaginal intercourse between a man and a 
woman. And the crime against nature is not a prostitution offense because it has 
no commercial element.8 After Lawrence, criminality cannot turn merely on the 
 
 * J.D. & LL.M., Duke University School of Law, expected 2007; B.A. & B.S. University of 
Pennsylvania. 
 1. 539 U.S. 558, 569 (2003). 
 2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-203 (2005) (criminalizing the “crime against nature”); State v. Harward, 
142 S.E.2d 691, 692 (N.C. 1965) (1965) (construing the statute to apply to a broad range of sexual 
conduct). 
 3. State v. Tyner, 272 S.E.2d 626, 627 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). 
 4. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560 (“[I]ndividual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical 
relationships . . . are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by due process.”). 
 5. State v. Pope, 608 S.E.2d 114, 115 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 6. Pope, 608 S.E.2d at 115 (citing Tyner, 272 S.E.2d at 627 (defining solicitation as the 
“counseling, enticing, or inducing another to commit a crime”)). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Nor does solicitation of the crime against nature require add a commercial element. See 
Tyner, 272 S.E.2d at 627. The term “solicitation” is problematic because it has multiple meanings; in 
other contexts it can be a synonym for prostitution. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (8th ed. 2004) (3d 
listed definition of “solicitation”). 
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type of physical intimacy chosen, but rather it must depend on some external, 
validly regulated element, such as a commercial exchange. 
Pope is more than just a bungled state court opinion. It reveals deep un-
certainty about the legality of solicitation of sexual conduct in North Carolina 
after Lawrence. Indeed, Pope is just one of an increasing number of cases where 
North Carolina courts have—without any guidance from the General 
Assembly—attempted to adapt the crime-against-nature statute to survive Law-
rence by refashioning the elements of the offense on a case-by-case basis.9 
North Carolinians deserve better than the uncertainty of ad hoc judicial 
criminal lawmaking. It is the responsibility of the General Assembly to legislate 
the criminal law and give due notice of what is—and is not—legal in the State of 
North Carolina after Lawrence. Properly reformed regulations of sexual activity 
would—without impermissibly discriminating between forms of physical 
intimacy—clearly identify those additional elements, such as a commercial 
exchange, that would render any physical intimacy a crime. 
II. NORTH CAROLINA SOLICITATION LAWS BEFORE LAWRENCE 
North Carolina regulates solicitation of sexual activity under two separate 
regimes: vaginal intercourse between a man and a woman is subject to one set of 
regulations, and all other forms of sexual intimacy—whether heterosexual or 
homosexual—are regulated as “crimes against nature.” Commercialization of 
sex—that is, offering or receiving any form of sexual conduct in exchange for 
money—is ostensibly prohibited under the corresponding regime. Vaginal, 
heterosexual sex for money is prohibited as prostitution, while all other forms of 
physical intimacy-for-hire are prohibited as solicitation of the crime against 
nature. The following figure illustrates the difference. 
 




 Form of Intimacy  
All Other 
Forms of Intimacy 
Conduct Alone 
Crime Against Nature 
(felony under 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-203) 
(not criminalized) 
Solicitation of Conduct 
(enticing or encouraging) 
Prostitution 
(misdemeanor under 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
177) 
Commercialization 
(offering or receiving 
conduct for money) 
Solicitation of the Crime 
Against Nature 
(misdemeanor under 
State v. Tyner) 
 
 9. See discussion infra Part V. 
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Prostitution is defined by North Carolina’s criminal code as “the offering or 
receiving of the body for sexual intercourse for hire.”10 In State v. Richardson, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina construed this statute to apply only to 
vaginal, heterosexual sex.11 Consistent with the canon that criminal laws are to 
be interpreted narrowly, the court explained that “[i]f the legislature wishes to 
include within [the prostitution statute] other sexual acts, such as cunnilingus, 
fellatio, masturbation, buggery or sodomy, it should do so with specificity.”12 
Under Richardson, all forms of physical intimacy, even when offered or received 
for money, fall squarely outside North Carolina’s definition of prostitution. 
By contrast, the crime-against-nature statute purports to criminalize certain 
forms of physical intimacy directly, without regard to whether they are 
performed for money.13 The statute provides that “[i]f any person shall commit 
the crime against nature . . . he shall be punished as a Class I felon.”14 This 
modern version of the ancient sodomy statute15 was interpreted expansively by 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina to include all “sexual intercourse contrary 
to the order of nature . . . [including] acts between humans per anum and per 
os.”16 Indeed, the court emphasized that “our statute is broad enough to 
include . . . other forms of the offense than sodomy and buggery.”17 
As with solicitation of other felonies, solicitation to commit the crime 
against nature is punishable as a separate offense at North Carolina common 
law.18 The inchoate crime of solicitation is defined generally as “urging, 
advising, commanding, or otherwise inciting another to commit a crime.”19 In 
 
 10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-203 (2005). The statute also considers “offering or receiving of the body 
for indiscriminate sexual intercourse without hire” to be prostitution. Id. 
 11. 300 S.E.2d 379, 381 (N.C. 1983) (citing a dictionary in holding that “sexual intercourse” 
refers only to “actual contact of the sexual organs of a man and a woman, and an actual penetration 
into the body of the latter”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (2005). 
 14. Id. 
 15. The crime against nature has been prohibited by statute in common-law jurisdictions for 
centuries. E.g. An Acte for the punysshement of the vice of Buggerie (The Buggery Act), 25 Hen. VIII, 
c. 6 (1533) (Eng.) (making a felony “the detestable and abominable vice of buggery committed with 
mankind or beast”). Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192–94 (1986) (surveying the 
“ancient roots” of sodomy statutes in the United States), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568–69 
(2003) (“[E]arly American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought 
to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally.”). 
 16. Harward, 142 S.E.2d at 692 (citations omitted). 
 17. Id. 
 18. North Carolina common law has long recognized the offense of solicitation to commit a 
felony. State v. Hampton, 186 S.E. 251, 252 (N.C. 1936) (“Is it a substantive common-law offense to 
solicit another to commit a felony, when the solicitation is of no effect, and the crime solicited is not 
in fact committed? By the clear weight of authority, the question must be answered in the 
affirmative.”). The common-law crime of solicitation, though recognized in Hampton was not created 
by it; solicitation to commit a felony is recognized in North Carolina’s criminal code. See N.C. GEN. 
STAT § 14-1 (2005) (incorporating pre-existing common law); N.C. GEN. STAT § 14-2.6 (2005) (defining 
sentences for solicitation of felonies separately from sentences applicable to the felonies themselves). 
 19. BLACK’S, supra note 8, at 1427. See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 11.1(a) (4th ed. 
2003). Solicitation as a separate offense is recognized by the Model Penal Code. Model Penal Code 
§ 5.02 (1962) (solicitation to commit a crime punishable to the same extent as the underlying crime, 
regardless of whether the crime is carried out). 
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State v. Tyner, a North Carolina Court of Appeals acknowledged the offense of 
solicitation of the crime against nature.20 
Solicitation of the crime against nature, however, is not a prostitution 
offense because it lacks the requisite commercial element. The Tyner court was 
clear that liability for solicitation derives from the criminality of the underlying 
conduct, holding that “[t]he gravamen of the offense of solicitation to commit a 
felony lies in counseling, enticing, or inducing another to commit a crime.”21 
While a commercial exchange is the gravamen of prostitution, defendants have 
been convicted of solicitation of the crime against nature even where the offer of 
intimacy was non-commercial.22 
Indeed, that the crime-against-nature statute seeks to punish an 
individual’s choice of forms of physical intimacy is demonstrated by the fact 
that the conduct itself actually constitutes a more serious offense than a mere 
offer to engage in it. After Lawrence, such conduct-based regulation is 
unconstitutional.23 Therefore, criminal liability cannot turn on the form of the 
conduct. Instead, criminality may only be predicated upon those extrinsic 
aspects (such as a commercial element) that have survived Lawrence as 
justifications for criminalizing sexual activity. 
III. NORTH CAROLINA SOLICITATION LAWS AFTER LAWRENCE 
The Lawrence decision has profound significance for North Carolina 
because it holds unconstitutional statutes that would criminalize a choice 
between forms of sexual intimacy. John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, 
both adults, were engaging in consensual, non-commercial sex in a private 
residence in Houston, Texas, when police officers entered the home.24 Because 
the two were of the same gender, they were charged under a Texas statute 
proscribing “deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same 
sex.”25 
Appealing their conviction to a Texas intermediate appellate court, the 
couple challenged the constitutionality of the statute on grounds of due process26 
(right to privacy) and equal protection27 (discrimination based on sex and sexual 
orientation). Relying on Bowers v. Hardwick,28 the Texas court rejected the 
argument that homosexual conduct falls within a zone of protected consensual 
sexual activity.29 On the equal protection claim, the Texas court reasoned that 
 
 20. 272 S.E.2d 626, 627 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (distinguishing between solicitation and attempt to 
commit sodomy). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Hodgkins v. North Carolina Real Estate Comm’n, 504 S.E.2d 789, 792 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1998) (noting petitioner’s prior conviction for solicitation of the crime against nature where the 
conduct was not offered for hire). 
 23. See discussion infra Part III. 
 24. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 25. Id. The relevant statute is TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003). 
 26. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
 27. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 351 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 28. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 29. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 360. 
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homosexuals were not a suspect class and that the law facially applied only to 
homosexual conduct, not homosexual status.30 With respect to gender, the court 
upheld the law on the grounds that both sexes were subject to the same rule and 
the law did not advantage one sex over another.31 The court thus rejected the 
equal protection challenge and upheld the law, citing morality and health 
concerns as rational bases supporting the statute.32 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed on due process grounds. 
The privacy right at issue, the Court held, was the right to choose one form of 
intimate conduct over another without governmental interference. The Court 
began its right-to-privacy analysis with the liberty interest recognized in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.33 In Griswold, the Court held that married couples have a 
right to choose whether to use contraception and emphasized the privacy of the 
marital bedroom.34 Characterizing the holding in Griswold as a “right to make 
certain decisions regarding sexual conduct,” the Lawrence Court reiterated that 
Eisenstadt v. Baird had extended that right to non-married couples.35 
The Court emphasized the broader right of individuals to choose one type 
of relationship over another.36 Recognizing that forms of sexual conduct vary 
depending on the type of relationship chosen, the Court made clear its intention 
to protect a fundamental choice “touching on the most private human conduct, 
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”37 
That Lawrence protects a right of choice is confirmed by the fact that the 
decision does not rest on equal protection grounds.38 It is further confirmed by 
the exceptions to the liberty interest articulated by the Court. In a frequently 
cited passage, Lawrence sets limits to its holding: “The present case does not 
involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or 
who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It 
does not involve public conduct or prostitution.”39 Indeed, each “exception”40 
confirms that sex laws are valid only when supported by legitimate 
governmental interests beyond a mere preference for one form of physical 
intimacy over another. 
 
 30. Id. at 353–55. 
 31. Id. at 359. 
 32. Id. (“To the extent the statute has a disproportionate impact on homosexual conduct, the 
statute is supported by a legitimate state interest.”). 
 33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 34. Id. at 485. 
 35. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)). 
 36. Id. at 567. 
 37. Id. Of course, this right of choice is not unlimited, and the Court explained that it does not 
extend to sexual conduct that causes injury to others. Id. 
 38. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Rather than rely on the . . . Due Process Clause, as the 
Court does, I base my conclusion on the . . . Equal Protection Clause.”) (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 578. 
 40. While this Comment follows the practice of North Carolina courts in using the term 
“exception” to describe limits on the holding in Lawrence, it is worth noting that these limits are only 
exceptions by negative inference. For example, prohibitions on indecent exposure or sexual conduct 
with minors lie beyond the ratio decidendi of the case. At most, Lawrence enumerates the types of 
cases it is not deciding, leaving unanswered whether a liberty interest might be infringed by 
regulation of those cases. 
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In the case of consent, the government has an interest in protecting 
individuals from sexual conduct they do not want. Indeed, a consent 
requirement for sexual conduct further upholds the Lawrence right to choose 
one’s relationships and forms of intimacy when it protects the right to choose 
not to engage in sexual conduct. Along these lines, a state can validly regulate 
relationships with minors by declaring that minors lack the capacity to consent. 
The same is true with respect to relationships where consent may be illusory, 
such as within families, relationships involving positions of unequal power, 
such as between prison guards and inmates, and in circumstances of 
vulnerability to economic exploitation, such as with prostitution. 
Other limitations on Lawrence are easily traced to legitimate governmental 
interests independent of the form of intimacy at issue. Public sexual conduct, for 
example, may validly be regulated on the same ground as regulation of any 
other public activity. If a city can prohibit skateboarding in the park as a valid 
exercise of its police power, it can certainly prohibit sexual conduct at the park 
on the same rational basis without interfering with an individual’s right to 
choose among forms of private intimacy.41 
Similarly, prostitution may validly be regulated after Lawrence because its 
commercial nature implicates consent and public health concerns.42 
Commercialization of sex creates incentives to trade consent for money, 
rendering that consent illusory. Commercialization of sex also creates an 
incentive to increase the number of sexual partners one has, increasing the risk 
of public health problems. Note that individual promiscuity does not implicate 
public health in the same way: the right of an individual to choose multiple 
partners falls squarely within the liberty interest recognized in Lawrence. Rather, 
prostitution is different because the commercial aspect provides an additional 
incentive to have more sexual partners. One reason that prostitution laws pass 
muster under Lawrence is that they regulate the commercial nature of the 
conduct without seeking to influence private choices in the form of physical 
intimacy between consenting adults. 
In short, Lawrence stands for the proposition that the state cannot interfere 
with an individual’s liberty interest in choosing between forms of physical 
intimacy. Rather, the state may only regulate sexual activity with respect to 
other considerations, such as the consent of the participants, the public location 
of the conduct, or the commercial element of intimacy-for-hire. 
IV. CURRENT UNCERTAINTY IN NORTH CAROLINA’S SOLICITATION LAWS 
Teresa Pope was charged with solicitation of the crime against nature and 
challenged the constitutionality of that charge in light of Lawrence. 43 There is no 
 
 41. An analogy to the First Amendment doctrine of “time, place, and manner” limits on speech 
is instructive. Government can regulate speech in the pubic forum as long as that speech is 
permitted somewhere. The fundamental right to speech, therefore, gives some ground to a content-
neutral regulation of public conduct. If a right to speech can be regulated in public, a privacy right 
should, a fortiori, be amenable to limitations in public fora. 
 42. The public health dimension of prostitution has been widely documented. See, e.g., Micole 
Bingham, Nevada Sex Trade: A Gamble for the Workers, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 69, 74 (1998). 
 43. State v. Pope, 608 S.E.2d 114, 116 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
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doubt that the form of physical intimacy that she offered to two undercover 
police officers for money—oral sex—falls within North Carolina’s definition of 
the crime against nature.44 Nor is there doubt that, under Lawrence, 
criminalization of that form of physical intimacy is, without more, 
unconstitutional.45 And, as discussed, making solicitation a criminal offense is 
valid only if the solicited conduct is actually a crime.46 
Nevertheless, a North Carolina Court of Appeals panel upheld the charge, 
declaring, in conclusory fashion: “As the Lawrence court expressly excluded 
prostitution and public conduct from its holding, the State of North Carolina 
may properly criminalize the solicitation of a sexual act it deems a crime against 
nature.”47 It is unclear whether the Pope court relied on the prostitution or public 
conduct exception, but neither choice saves the solicitation of the crime against 
nature as a criminal offense under current North Carolina statutory law. 
The prostitution exception in Lawrence is unavailing because solicitation of 
the crime against nature is not a prostitution offense. The prostitution exception, 
at most, admits of a valid governmental interest in regulating the 
commercialization of intimacy.48 The exception cannot create criminal liability 
where none existed before. Rather, the exception merely reserves for states the 
option of criminalizing prostitution. On this score, North Carolina has a 
prostitution statute and has chosen to limit that statute to vaginal, heterosexual 
sex.49 Teresa Pope offered to perform a different form of physical intimacy—one 
that falls outside the prostitution statute. 
Nor can Pope logically rely on the “public conduct” exception in Lawrence. 
This is because the exception refers to sexual conduct itself—which Ms. Pope 
never actually performed—and not to mere conversations about it.50 Indeed, the 
First Amendment implications of a law criminalizing speech about otherwise 
legal conduct are significant. A general solicitation offense is, at bottom, a 
content-specific speech regulation that prohibits the communication of one 
message while leaving other messages unaffected. As such, it is subject to strict 
 
 44. The Pope court relied on State v. Stiller, 590 S.E.2d 305, 307 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (the crime 
against nature “is broad enough to include all forms of oral and anal sex”). Interestingly, Stiller was 
decided after Lawrence, but without reference to it. 
 45. State v. Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d 576, 580–81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that Lawrence 
invalidated the crime-against-nature offense with regard to oral sex conducted in private and with 
the consent of both adult participants). 
 46. See 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 181 (2005) (“The gist of the offense is incitement; the policy 
behind the prohibition of solicitation is to protect people from exposure to inducements to commit 
or join in the commission of a crime.”). 
 47. Pope, 608 S.E.2d at 116. 
 48. Although the Lawrence Court did not explain its exception, demonstrable health and safety 
considerations provide a valid basis for governmental regulation of intimacy-for-hire—grounds that 
exist independently of a mere disapproval of the form of intimate physical conduct. 
 49. State v. Richardson, 300 S.E.2d 379, 380–81 (N.C. 1983). See supra notes 10–12 and 
accompanying text. 
 50. Though the record is silent on the point, even if Ms. Pope had offered to perform her 
services in public (thereby potentially bringing her solicited conduct within the Lawrence exception 
for public conduct) an appropriate charge might have been solicitation of a sex-in-public offense, 
rather than solicitation of the crime against nature (which lacks a public conduct element). 
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scrutiny.51 Ordinarily, criminal solicitation laws overcome the First Amendment 
on either of two theories. One is that words encouraging another to commit a 
crime are not protected under the First Amendment because they are likely to 
lead to imminent unlawful conduct.52 Alternatively, solicitation laws advance 
the compelling governmental interest in preventing crime.53 Under either theory, 
the solicitation offense is justified by the illegal nature of the solicited act.54 In 
Teresa Pope’s case, because the conduct—oral sex—is protected under Lawrence, 
the First Amendment would bar criminalization of mere solicitation of that 
conduct. 
V. REFORM OF NORTH CAROLINA’S SOLICITATION LAWS REQUIRES LEGISLATIVE 
ACTION, NOT JUDICIAL FIAT 
There is little doubt that North Carolina retains the authority to criminalize 
the commercialization of sexual activity. The state’s authority, however, is 
subject to the rule that the “creation and expansion of criminal offenses is the 
prerogative of the legislative branch of the government.”55 Echoing this rejection 
of contemporary judge-made criminal law, the United States Supreme Court 
held that “because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal 
punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, 
legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”56 
In the more than three years since Lawrence, North Carolina’s General 
Assembly has failed to address the prostitution or crime-against-nature statutes. 
In the absence of legislative action, punishment of prostitution involving forms 
of intimacy other than vaginal, heterosexual sex could only be accomplished by 
 
 51. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2003) (holding that a law 
applying only to cable transmissions with sexual content was content-specific and therefore subject 
to strict scrutiny). Speech about sex is subject to somewhat different First Amendment standards, 
including an exception for obscenity laws. Though obscenity might be implicated in the extreme 
case, it is irrelevant here because it would likely apply equally to public discussion of hetero- and 
homosexual practices alike. 
 52. The controlling case for incitement speech is Brandenburg v. Ohio, holding that the First 
Amendment does not protect speech that is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 53. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 535, 579 (2001) (“The harm that the State seeks 
to prevent is the harm caused by the unlawful activity that is solicited; it is unrelated to the 
commercial transaction itself.”). 
 54. An alternative justification for regulating the type of speech at issue here—prevention of 
moral offense to others—has generally been rejected. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 
U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (striking down a prohibition on advertisements of contraceptives where sale and 
use of contraceptives is otherwise legal); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 13 (1971) (holding that, absent 
additional justifications, the fact that obscene or offensive words might cause distress to others was 
insufficient to regulate the speech). 
 55. State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 1989). 
 56. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (citations omitted). Both Beale and Bass 
necessarily apply to modern judge-made crimes, and not to common law developed prior to 
enactment of North Carolina’s reception statute. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. This 
reasoning is analogous to that underlying the Rule of Lenity. See BLACK’S, supra note 8, at 1359 (“[A] 
court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute . . . should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the 
more lenient punishment.”). Here, however, the principle applies to the definition of the crime, 
rather than to its punishment. 
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judicial lawmaking: either expanding the scope of the prostitution statute or 
creating a new crime by adding a commercial element to the crime against 
nature. 
The prostitution statute cannot be amended or expanded by judicial fiat 
because it has long been the rule in North Carolina that “criminal statutes 
should be strictly construed.”57 As the United States Supreme Court has 
explained, “when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct 
Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate before we choose the harsher 
alternative, to require that Congress [i.e. any legislature] should have spoken in 
language that is clear and definite.”58 Indeed, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
applied this principle in construing the scope of the prostitution statute in the 
Richardson case, holding that “[i]f the legislature wishes to include within [the 
prostitution statute] other sexual acts . . . it should do so with specificity.”59 
Unless and until the General Assembly acts, therefore, the prostitution statute 
remains limited to criminalizing vaginal, heterosexual intimacy-for-hire.60 
Nor should North Carolina courts rely on a theory of common-law 
authority to criminalize conduct.61 Although North Carolina is among the states 
that continue to recognize common-law crimes, the state does not tolerate 
judicial creation of wholly new crimes.62 Rather, by virtue of its reception statute, 
North Carolina has merely adopted the common law as it stood in England at 
the time North Carolina began writing its own laws.63 And although 
constructive notice might be imputed where the elements of an ancient crime are 
part of the existing body of common law, there is no authority to suggest that a 
court can, in response to the constitutional invalidation of a common-law crime, 
 
 57. State v. Hearst, 567 S.E.2d 124, 128 (N.C. 2002); Beale, 376 S.E.2d at 4. 
 58. Bass, 404 U.S. at 347. 
 59. Richardson, 300 S.E.2d at 381. 
 60. This result is compelled by judicial constraint consistent with North Carolina precedent. 
Judicial expansion of the prostitution statute in a given case might further be inconsistent with the 
Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, for lack of notice, although this would not be true for 
subsequent applications of the new rule. 
To the extent that a common-law prostitution offense may have existed and included forms of 
physical intimacy other than vaginal, heterosexual intimacy-for-hire, it was undoubtedly superceded 
by statute. See, e.g., State v. Holmon, 244 S.E.2d 491, 493 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (“Since the new 
statute . . . supersedes the common-law crime of kidnapping, common-law kidnapping no longer 
exists in North Carolina.” (citation omitted)); accord N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1 (receiving only “such 
parts of the common law . . . not abrogated”). 
 61. Such a course might garner legitimacy from the General Assembly’s enactment of a 
reception statute, which arguably implies intent to criminalize the crime against nature in both 
commercial and non-commercial settings. However, absent more express and specific guidance, 
judicial authority to legislate the criminal law would lack meaningful constraint. 
 62. See Beale, 376 S.E.2d at 3–4 (holding that the court lacks the authority at common law to 
expand the definition of murder to include the death of an unborn fetus). 
 63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1. (“All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use 
within this State . . . which has not been otherwise provided for in whole or in part, not abrogated, 
repealed, or become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in full force within this State.” (emphasis 
added)). See also Beale, 376 S.E.2d at 2 (applying the common law as it existed when the reception 
statute was first enacted in 1715). 
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unilaterally revive that crime by refashioning its elements on a case-by-case 
basis.64 
Unmoored to either statutory or common-law authority in the wake of 
Lawrence, North Carolina courts are adrift on a course of case-by-case definition 
of the state’s criminal laws relating to sexual conduct. The confusion over 
“solicitation” laws seen in State v. Pope is just one example. Two other recent 
cases demonstrate how, absent legislative action, courts are scrambling to adapt 
criminal statutes by creating new crimes. In State v. Whiteley,65 a defendant 
appealed a crime-against-nature conviction on Lawrence grounds.66 The Court of 
Appeals admitted that because the acts were private, between adults, and non-
commercial, conviction could only be constitutional after Lawrence if the conduct 
were not consensual.67 So, the court grafted onto the statute a new non-consent 
element.68 
In a second case, In re R.L.C., the same court upheld a crime-against-nature 
conviction involving minors.69 Under the logic of Whiteley, the conviction could 
not stand unless the minor age of the participants was an element of the offense. 
Had the case involved vaginal—rather than oral—sex, the defendant’s conduct 
would have fallen under the rape statute, which does not criminalize conduct 
between minors of similar age.70 However, because the chosen form of sexual 
conduct fell under the crime-against-nature statute, which has no like-age 
exception (or, indeed, any age requirement at all), the court upheld the 
conviction and “reject[ed] defendant’s suggestion that we graft age 
requirements into [the crime-against-nature statute] which the General 
Assembly has not seen fit to enact.”71 
The reasoning of the R.L.C. court defies logic. If the crime-against-nature 
conviction is valid only because of the age of the participants, then what law 
determines the age of sexual minority? The court, as a matter of logic, must have 
grafted some age element to save the statute after Lawrence.72 Further, in crafting 
that age requirement, what is the court’s authority to ignore the legislature’s 
 
 64. This is true even if a new common-law offense were made prospective only to moot the 
notice issue. 
 65. 616 S.E.2d 576 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 66. Id. at 577. 
 67. Id. at 581 (“[T]o be constitutional post-Lawrence on the facts of this case, the State must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the sexual act . . . and that such an act 
was non-consensual.”). 
 68. Id. (finding prejudicial error for “failure to instruct [the jury] on each element of a crime” 
(emphasis added)); State v. Scott, 331 N.C. 39, 46 (1992) (pre-Lawrence decision holding that 
“[c]onsent . . . is not a defense to crime against nature”). 
 69. 635 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006), appeal pending., No. 531A06 (N.C.). 
 70. See id. at 2–4 (responding to defendant’s argument criminalization of non-procreative—but 
not procreative—sex is invalid after Lawrence). 
 71. Id. at 4. 
 72. The court alternatively rests on the apparently public nature of the conduct to escape 
unconstitutionality under Lawrence. Id. at 5. However, under this alternative, the public nature of the 
conduct would, under Whitelely, have necessarily have become an element “grafted” onto the 
offense. 
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most recent articulation of the age of sexual minority in the statutory rape 
context?73 
The result of these cases is a haphazard, piecemeal approach to defining the 
criminal law that is unpredictable at best and unconstitutionally vague at worst. 
Each defendant is left to challenge the constitutionality of each crime-against-
nature charge, rolling the dice to see whether the facts of his or her case may 
constitute a new, judge-made offense.74 The United States Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected the notion that the criminal law can “set a net large enough 
to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say 
who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at large.”75 North 
Carolina, however, is doing precisely that by shifting the legislative function 
from the General Assembly to the courts.76 
Judicial lawmaking in this area deprives North Carolina residents of clear 
notice of the law. North Carolina’s Supreme Court has declared that “citizens 
subject to [a] statute may not be required to guess at their peril as to its true 
meaning.”77 At present, however, individuals are forced to guess the effect on 
North Carolina statutes of the Lawrence decision—a decision that is seemingly 
intentionally vague.78 The vagueness concerns the extent to which the crime-
against-nature statute is still valid. Even if it is commonly known what conduct 
historically qualified as a “crime against nature” in North Carolina,79 and even if 
cases like Pope, Whiteley, and R.L.C. have revived criminality of that conduct in 
certain contexts, very little could be understood about what conduct that might 
 
 73. See id. at 6–8 (dissent) (surveying 1979 and 1995 amendments to laws regulating sexual 
activity involving minors and concluding that “our General Assembly has dictated that there is no 
legitimate state interest in the regulation of minors less than three years apart in age, absent the use 
of force.”). 
 74. Four other Lawrence-based challenges to criminal laws have reached the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals level, all involving minors. In each case, criminality derived from the age of the 
participants under statutorily defined age limits, and not from the form of sexual conduct at issue. See 
State v. Browning, 629 S.E.2d 299 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (statutory rape); State v. Moore, 606 S.E.2d 127 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (statutory rape); State v. Oakley, 605 S.E.2d 215 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (sexual 
activity by a substitute parent); State v. Clark, 588 S.E.2d 66 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (statutory rape). 
 75. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 
(1876)). 
 76. Beale, 376 S.E.2d at 4 (“The creation and expansion of criminal offenses is the prerogative of 
the legislative branch of the government”); State ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807, 810–11 
(W. Va. 1984) (reciting policy reasons why courts should defer creation or expansion of crimes to the 
legislature). 
 77. State v. Graham, 233 S.E.2d 615, 620 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977). 
 78. The Lawrence decision is notorious for its delicate avoidance of key issues such as whether a 
fundamental right is implicated, coquettishly referring instead to “fundamental decisions” and 
“fundamental propositions.” Compare Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[N]owhere 
does the Court’s opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a ‘fundamental right’ under the Due 
Process Clause . . . .”) with Lawrence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1955 (2004) (“What is truly ‘fundamental’ in substantive due 
process, Lawrence tells us, is not the set of specific acts that have been found to merit constitutional 
protection, but rather the relationships and self-governing commitments out of which those acts 
arise . . . .”). 
 79. State v. Poe, 252 S.E.2d 843, 845 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the crime against nature 
statute was not unconstitutionally vague because persons of reasonable intelligence know what 
constitutes a crime against nature). 
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next be criminalized by judicial lawmaking. After Lawrence, it is clear that the 
vast majority of acts of physical intimacy are constitutionally protected and may 
only be criminalized in limited cases.80 The North Carolina General Assembly, 
however, has refused to redraw the statutory lines in light of that decision. 
When it comes to commercial solicitation of sex, not even North Carolina 
courts are clear on what the law is. The Pope decision, discussed previously, 
erroneously conflated the term “solicitation,” used to describe an inchoate 
criminal offense at common law, with “prostitution.” Further, in addition to this 
confusion over “solicitation,” the Whiteley and R.L.C. cases demonstrate that 
North Carolina courts are now legislating the state’s criminal sex laws, deciding 
on their own which new elements to graft onto otherwise unconstitutional 
criminal offenses. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a criminal statute is 
unconstitutionally vague when ordinary people cannot understand what 
conduct is prohibited.81 An ordinary person could be forgiven for thinking that a 
mere invitation to engage in otherwise legal sexual conduct would not be a 
crime. Indeed, an ordinary person could be forgiven for failing to guess 
correctly how North Carolina courts would next amend the laws in light of 
Lawrence. The people of North Carolina deserve clear guidance from their 
General Assembly about what is and is not criminal behavior. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It has been nearly four years since the Lawrence opinion brought 
uncertainty to North Carolina’s laws regulating sexual activity. And yet, while 
Lawrence has unquestionably invalidated many of these laws, the General 
Assembly has failed to revisit the affected statutes and clarify the criminal law. 
The result has been an expanding patchwork of judge-made law as courts 
struggle to fill in the holes in violation of the principle of separation of powers 
between the judicial and legislative branches. Although Lawrence does invalidate 
laws that interfere with an individual’s right to choose between forms of 
physical intimacy, states still have ample authority to regulate sexual activity. 
Rather than leave this task to the courts, the General Assembly should reform 
North Carolina statutes in a way that does not regulate individual choices 
between forms of physical intimacy but instead clarifies the circumstances—
such as a commercial exchange—that would make any sexual conduct a crime. 
 
 80. Although void-for-vagueness cases generally deal with statutes that are vague as to their 
applicability to different situations, the reasoning is the same in cases like Pope, where it is unclear 
whether a statute is constitutional as applied to different situations. 
 81. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357. 
